The art of untangling : High North SME board directors’ challenges in understanding strategy, control, and service tasks by Fjellvær, Hilde et al.
16 BARENTS STUDIES: Governance in the High North: Rhetoric and reality in the Barents region VOL. 6 |  ISSUE 1  |  2019 SPECIAL ISSUE
The art of untangling: 
High North SME board directors’  
challenges in understanding strategy, 
control, and service tasks
HILDE FJELLVÆR, NTNU Norwegian University of Science and Technology
TRUDE HØGVOLD OLSEN 1, UiT The Arctic University of Norway 
and ELSA SOLSTAD, UiT The Arctic University of Norway
ABSTRACT
Boards of directors represent an important, but understudied, resource for business 
development of High North SMEs. We studied board director perceptions of what 
constitutes the most important board tasks and which activities each major task 
actually involved. We followed a local board development project with participants 
from several industries and companies in Northern Norway over a two-year period, 
collecting data through observation, surveys, and documents. This study identifies 
two challenges of the contribution of board directors to business development: (1) 
board directors had only a vague understanding of strategy and service tasks, and (2) 
there was a mismatch between what SME boards need (strategy) and what board di-
rectors seemed to focus on (control). This implies that board directors in High North 
SMEs may have an unrealized potential for contributing to business development. 
Development of board competence seems vital to fulfil this potential.
INTRODUCTION
The High North as a geographical region has been conceptualized in a variety of 
ways (Skagestad 2010). Whatever the conceptualization, the region faces challenges 
of demography, growth, and development (Arctic human development report 
2004; Bjørnå and Mikalsen 2016). The contribution of several actors to growth and 
development in the region – such as mayors (Bjørnå and Mikalsen 2016) and global 
production networks (Nilsen and Jòhannesson 2016) – has been noted. However, 
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several other actors also play important roles in development. Boards and board 
directors are one example. For small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and 
start-up firms in the High North, the board of directors may be crucial for growth 
and development. The reason is that directors bring in resources that complement 
the management’s competences (Gabrielsson and Huse 2002; Knockaert and 
Ucbasaran 2013; Machold et al. 2011), particularly if they are able to help reduce 
the complexity and uncertainty associated with strategic decisions (Rindova 1999). 
Although Fiegener (2005) finds that strategic participation is not a dominant activity 
of directors in SMEs, Gabrielsson and Huse (2002) propose that board participation 
in innovation processes is especially crucial for small companies. Thus, small firms 
may be more dependent on the board for their future survival and growth (Huse 
2000) than larger firms are. SMEs in peripheral regions may be even more dependent 
on external resources because they are situated outside densely populated areas with 
less available competences and networks.
For a long time, a majority of corporate governance studies focused on board moni-
toring tasks (Tricker 2012; Zattoni and Pugliese 2012). Although the focus has shifted 
over the last decade, the issue of boards as strategic partners is still understudied 
(Huse and Gabrielsson 2012; Pugliese et al. 2009). Machold et al. (2011, 368) propose 
that boards may contribute to business development because they “constitute an im-
portant organizational asset, … [and] add an important strategic dimension to small 
firms”. Our study focuses on the board director as the unit of analysis (Knockaert and 
Ucbasaran 2013; Machold and Farquhar 2013), as this can shed light on how indivi-
duals’ understanding of board tasks influences their contribution to board processes 
and results. Thus this paper adds to the already existing research on chair and CEO 
contributions (Minichilli and Huse 2011). The following research questions guided 
our study: how do board directors of SMEs in the High North describe (1) the balan-
ce between strategy, control, and service tasks and (2) their practice of these tasks? 
We followed a board development project with participants from several industries 
and companies in Northern Norway over two years. The project aimed to increase 
individual directors’ competences.
This study contributes to the existing research in two ways. First, we augment the 
research on board tasks in small firms (Huse and Gabrielsson 2012; Pugliese et al. 
2009; van den Heuvel, Van Gils, and Voordeckers 2006) by showing that individuals’ 
perceptions of control, service, and strategy tasks vary in clarity. In particular, we 
have identified that directors labelled some strategy work as control tasks. Second, 
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our data imply a mismatch between what the boards should do and what board di-
rectors actually focus on in their work. We discuss the implications of these findings 
for business development in the High North.
Following this introduction, we review the literature on board tasks in general 
and strategy involvement in particular. We then describe the empirical setting and 
the research methods applied. The empirical findings are presented and discussed 
before concluding remarks are offered and theoretical and practical implications are 
discussed.
LITERATURE REVIEW 
SME boards have sometimes been assumed to be less involved in business develop-
ment than large firm boards (Fiegener 2005). However, Nordqvist, and Minichilli 
(2009) suggest that this assumption is changing and that individual board directors’ 
motivation can be an important determinant of their involvement in value-creating 
work. It is therefore interesting to pursue how individual board directors understand 
their tasks and how this influences their approach to board work.
The literature on how boards are involved in strategy tasks varies in scope and direc-
tion. Much of the literature focuses on antecedents to board involvement, such as the 
CEO influence (Fiegener 2005; Westphal 1999), ownership status (Fiegener 2005), or 
board size, tenure, composition, and power (Golden and Zajac 2001). Other studies 
consider the strategic perspective that boards take (Carpenter and Westphal, 2001) 
and the types of strategic involvement in which they engage (Gabrielsson and Politis 
2009; Hendry and Kiel 2004; Pugliese and Wenstøp 2007). The purpose of our study 
is related to the latter concerns. Thus, to gain a deeper understanding of what boards 
actually do (Machold and Farquhar 2013) and how they play a role in developing 
business, we review the contributions discussing the overall tasks that boards are ex-
pected to undertake (Hung 1998; Huse, Gabrielsson, and Minichilli 2005) and which 
activities these entail (Machold et al. 2011).
Core board tasks
In the quest for the ideal configuration of effective boards, the focus varies according 
to different theoretical frameworks (Hendry and Kiel 2004), and authors take diffe-
rent views on what constitutes the most appropriate constellation (Johnson, Daily, 
and Ellstrand 1996).
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One large body of research on board work is geared towards the control tasks of the 
board (Tricker 2012; Van Ees, Gabrielsson, and Huse 2009). In particular, major parts 
of the corporate governance literature are concerned with the board as a monitoring 
and control device. Inspired by Fama and Jensen (1983) and Jensen and Meckling 
(1976), this research stream takes an agency perspective as its starting point (Zattoni 
and Pugliese 2012). Whether the discussion centres on how best the board can per-
form the control functions or the structures that need to be in place in order to sus-
tain the monitoring role (Baysinger and Hoskisson 1990; Forbes and Milliken 1999), 
the primary focus is on the board as a monitoring device (Hoskisson and Turk 1990). 
However, if the aim is to contribute to innovation and firm development, this will 
not be enough. Boards must engage in multiple activities to “create long-term values 
and sustainable competitive advantage” (Huse and Gabrielsson 2012, 233). Certain 
characteristics, such as the overlapping of governance structures and scarce manage-
rial competence (Nordqvist and Minichilli 2009, 384), indicate that, in SMEs, boards 
can and should contribute beyond a monitoring and control function (Kaufman and 
Englander 2005; Pugliese et al. 2009).
Board directors can also perform an important service task (Van den Heuvel, Van 
Gils, and Voordeckers 2006), implying more of a stakeholder view of firm develop-
ment, where firms aim for something more than protecting shareholder value 
(Huse and Rindova 2001). The board is seen as a provider of advice and counsel to 
the management (Johnson et al. 1996), as well as supporting through networking 
(Gabrielsson and Huse 2002) and assuming a legitimizing capacity in relation to 
external stakeholders (Huse and Rindova 2001). As an important source of business 
development, the board can be considered to “provide resources such as legitimacy, 
advice and counsel, links to other organizations etc.” (Hillman and Dalziel 2003, 
383). However, the impacts of service activities on business development are expec-
ted to be indirect, as these resources are already drawn upon by the management 
(Borch and Huse 1993; Huse and Rindova 2001).
In the endeavour to understand how boards can contribute to business development, 
the strategy task is more promising. To contribute to business development means 
to contribute to resolving the complexity and uncertainty associated with strategic 
decision-making (Rindova 1999). Hence, various combinations of knowledge and in-
formation and problem-solving capabilities are essential (Rindova 1999). Numerous 
ideas concerning how boards can contribute to strategic decision-making in general 
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(McNulty and Pettigrew 1999; Pugliese and Wenstøp 2007), and to innovation and 
entrepreneurship in particular (Gabrielsson and Politis 2009; Hoskisson et al. 2002), 
have been investigated.
One stream looks at how the formal structure and design promote strategic de-
cision-making by studying the interaction between actors inside and outside the 
boardroom. Studies highlight the interactions and relationships influencing boards 
and board behaviours, such as directors’ networks (Borch and Huse 1993; Carpenter 
and Westphal 2001; Van Ees et al. 2009), or they investigate the relationship between 
managers and directors, for example how CEOs involve board directors in strategic 
decision-making (Fiegener 2005; Westphal 1999). Board directors and executives 
share responsibility for the management of the firm’s affairs (Hendry and Kiel 2004; 
Rindova 1999), and the degree of interaction and interdependence between them 
will thus influence the way in which directors participate in strategic issues. Issues 
such as ownership and board heterogeneity in terms of tenure, age, and occupational 
background also influence the level of board involvement in strategic development 
(Huse 1990). Although this might indicate that board involvement would be high in 
SMEs, Fiegener (2005) finds that board involvement in strategic decision-making is, 
in reality, low due to a shortage of time and information. Because of the challenges of 
demography, growth, and development facing the High North region (Arctic human 
development report 2004; Bjørnå and Mikalsen 2016), it is particularly interesting to 
learn how board directors in this region engage in strategy.
Types of strategic involvement
Strategic management is about processes of organizational renewal and growth, 
and the capacity to deliver change in a high quality and timely fashion (McNulty 
and Pettigrew 1999). To achieve this, boards need to be involved in the making and 
shaping of strategic decisions (Taylor 2001) inside and outside the organization 
(Minichilli and Huse 2011). Boards not only ratify decisions – which McNulty and 
Pettigrew (1999, 55) call “taking strategic decisions” – but they also influence the 
processes of strategic choice, strategic change, and strategic control. Rindova (1999, 
953) suggests “that directors contribute to dealing with the complexity and uncer-
tainty associated with strategic decisions”, particularly when/if they possess valuable 
problem-solving expertise.
Board directors contribute to strategic decision-making by scanning the environ-
ment, by interpreting incoming information “to identify problems and develop solu-
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tions” (Rindova 1999, 964; Pugliese and Wenstøp 2007), by representing alternative 
frameworks and strategic understandings, and by counterbalancing the tendency for 
tunnel vision. In terms of exercising strategic control, directors possess a gate-kee-
ping function: they contribute to building confidence and selecting the CEO and 
other executives (Stiles 2001). They are also a source of evaluation and selection of 
alternatives, and can have a substantial impact on shaping ideas through the metho-
dologies and processes for content development (Hendry and Kiel 2004).
The studies discussed above certainly shed light on board tasks and boards’ strategy 
involvement, yet they consider directors’ understanding of what this role means in 
practice only to a limited degree. Machold and Farquhar (2013, 147) assert that due 
to a lack of studies on what boards actually do over time, we “have yet to see a com-
plete picture of board task constellations”. The aim of this paper is to show board di-
rectors’ perceptions of the variety of tasks they take on, as well as their interpretation 
of the actual behaviour attached to these tasks, thereby adding to our understanding 
of how boards in SMEs can contribute to business development. This is particularly 
important in a High North context as the naturally limited availability of experienced 
board directors means that SMEs in such regions need to take extra care in their 
recruitment and selection of directors.
EMPIRICAL SETTING
A regional industrial incubator in Northern Norway initiated The Board 
Development Project (BDP) in cooperation with local businesses. The BDP was 
grounded in an analysis showing that the regions’ businesses scored high on econo-
mic results but low on innovation and business development. Consequently, the aim 
of the BDP was to build stronger boards to assist business development in the region 
by providing board directors with necessary skills and by focusing on the recruit-
ment and training of young chairs/board directors. The project lasted from May 2012 
until April 2014, and the regional industrial incubator acted as the project manager. 
The first BDP sparked several similar board development projects in the region with 
similar focus and content; the most recent started in the spring of 2018. This suggests 
that the data is relevant for analysing contemporary challenges.
The BDP participants were experienced board directors and chairs, business people 
who wished to serve on boards, and young candidates with minimal board experien-
ce. The initial seminar took place in May 2012 with 45 participants, of whom 36 were 
THE ART OF UNTANGLING: HIGH NORTH SME BOARD DIRECTORS’  
CHALLENGES IN UNDERSTANDING STRATEGY, CONTROL, AND SERVICE TASKS
HILDE FJELLVÆR, TRUDE HØGVOLD OLSEN AND ELSA SOLSTAD  |  Pages 16– 37
22 BARENTS STUDIES: Governance in the High North: Rhetoric and reality in the Barents region VOL. 6 |  ISSUE 1  |  2019 SPECIAL ISSUE
experienced board directors, 16 with chair experience. During the project period, the 
number of participants increased to 57. Our data reveal the perceptions of actual and 
potential directors, filling a gap as most existing studies rely on the perceptions of 
chairs and CEOs (Minichilli and Huse 2011).
The project offered two different arenas for skill development: seminars and mentor–
protégé relations. The seminars included experts’ assessments of various board issues, 
highlighting that the board’s tasks extend beyond merely following laws and regulations. 
In each seminar, discussion groups consisting of a mix of experienced and inexperien-
ced board directors were organized. The mentors were experienced board directors and 
served as sparring partners for the protégés, who were young participants. In addition, 
the protégés enrolled as observers in an existing board, which offered them an opportu-
nity to observe how the skills they learned at the seminars could be put into practice.
RESEARCH METHODS
We used triangulation of methods to increase the validity of our study (Saunders, 
Lewis, and Thornhill 2012; Yin 2009). First, we observed all the project-initiated se-
minars and meetings. This gave us first-hand knowledge of the content and structure 
of the programme, and we easily engaged in informal chats with the participants. We 
took notes separately and discussed and revised our notes systematically after each 
seminar. Second, documents provided deeper knowledge about the project context. 
Third, questionnaires, including items from the project management as well as rese-
arch-related questions, were distributed to the project participants after three of the 
seminars. Table 1 presents an overview of the data sources.
This paper is mainly based on Survey 1 and Survey 3. Survey 1 was sent to all 45 
participants at the initial seminar, yielding a response rate of 76% (N=34). The survey 
included two open-ended questions regarding board tasks: (1) “What do you consi-
der as the board’s main task?” and (2) “At the seminar on 30 May, three main tasks 
for the board were presented. Please prioritize these according to importance and 
explain your prioritization.”
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Table 1: Data sources.
Activity
Number of 
researchers 
present
Number 
of partici-
pants 
Main content
45
34 
respondents
5
13 protégés
10 mentors
45
24
The board’s tasks and responsibilities
Perceptions of the board’s main tasks
Expectations to the mentor 
programme
Establishment of the mentor–protégé 
relations
Principles for excellent board work
Perceptions of the competence 
requirements for directors and chairs
3
2
2
1
30 May 
June
12 September 
15 October 
23 October 
October
Initial seminar
Survey 1 
Meeting for 
protégés 
Meeting for 
protégés and 
mentors
Seminar
Survey 2 
2012
Activity
Number of 
researchers 
present
Number 
of partici-
pants 
Main content
9 mentors
57
24 
respondents
8 protégés
12 mentors
168
33
The dialogue as a tool in mentor–
protégé relations
The board’s role in change processes 
and board development processes
Perceptions of the content of the 
board’s main roles
The mentor’s role in developing the 
board role
New forum for board work in the 
High North
The board’s monitoring task
Perceptions of good board work
2
2
1
3
2
21 January 
20 February 
March
24 April 
25 September 
11 November 
Meeting for 
mentors
Seminar
Survey 3 
Meeting for 
protégés and 
mentors
Regional 
conference 
Seminar
2013
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Survey 3 was designed to complement data from Survey 1. It was sent to all the 57 
participants in the BDP after the February 2013 seminar, yielding a response rate 
of 42% (N=24). The objective was to uncover the participants’ perceptions of their 
practice of board tasks. We asked four open-ended questions: (1) “What do you con-
sider as the board’s tasks?”, (2) “Please describe how you perform the board’s control 
task”, (3) “Please describe how you perform the board’s service task”, and (4) “How 
Activity
Number of 
researchers 
present
Number 
of partici-
pants 
Main content
26
10 protégés
7 mentors
31
Two participants presented their 
businesses and their boards’ strategic 
contributions
Evaluation of the mentor 
programme
Evaluation and closing of the 
programme
1
2
2
20 February  
7 April  
29 April 
Seminar
Meeting for 
protégés and 
mentors
Seminar
2014
Table 1: Data sources,  
continued.
Age OwnershipBoard 
director
Chair
34
24
SexN
Survey 1
Survey 3
17
14
17
10
13
9
20
10
1
5
28
18
13
7
21
17
19
9
15
15
6
6
Male Fem. 20-35 36-50 51-65 Yes No Yes No Yes No
Table 2: The characteristics  
of the respondents
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do you consider that the board can contribute to business development?” Question 4 
was designed to capture the board’s strategy tasks. In both surveys, the respondents 
offered comprehensive answers to these open-ended questions.
Table 2 shows the characteristics of the respondents in the two surveys. It is not 
possible to trace whether the respondents are the same in the two surveys. The BDP 
project manager explained that some participants contributed actively throughout 
the programme. Because respondents in both surveys participated at the June 2012 
and February 2013 seminars, it is reasonable to assume that respondents in Survey 3 
also responded to Survey 1.
We analysed data in several steps. First, all three researchers individually coded the 
open-ended data according to the control, strategy, and service tasks. Second, we 
compared the coding, discussed discrepancies, and agreed on a final coding. Third, 
we aimed to gain an understanding of the participants’ perceptions of the balance 
between the board tasks. Fourth, we analysed the participants’ descriptions of how 
they practised the different tasks.
We validated our findings at the November 2013 seminar by presenting the study 
and asking the participants three questions: (1) “Do the presented findings make 
sense to you?”, (2) “Are our explanations for the findings plausible?”, and (3) “Do you 
have other possible explanations?” The answers from 24 participants recognized and 
confirmed our findings and explanations.
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
In this section, we present the empirical findings by focusing first on the emphasis 
that the respondents placed on the different board tasks and then on how they de-
scribed their practice of these tasks.
The three board tasks
Our data show how the respondents prioritized the board tasks according to import-
ance, and suggest that the individual’s perceptions of task importance evolve over 
time. In Survey 1 and Survey 3, an open-ended question asked participants to descri-
be the board’s main task. In Survey 1, the respondents shared more quotes referring 
to control (30 quotes) than strategy (19 quotes) and service (10 quotes). In Survey 3, 
conducted nine months into the project, the participants seem to place greater stress 
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on strategy tasks (25 quotes) than on control (22 quotes) or service (12 quotes). If 
the number of quotes is indicative of the understanding of board tasks, this finding 
suggests that respondents increased their focus on strategy tasks over time. However, 
the participants are not consistent in their responses in Survey 1. When asked to 
prioritize the tasks according to perceived importance, 62.5% of the respondents 
highlighted strategy as the most important board task, 28.1% indicated control as the 
most important, and 9.4 % opted for service.
Table 3 shows that the youngest respondents prioritized control tasks as most im-
portant, the older group prioritized strategy tasks, while experienced board directors 
rated strategy as most important. This indicates that, as the respondents acquired 
more knowledge about board work, the importance of the strategy task increased. 
Although these results should be interpreted with caution because of the small N, 
they do give an indication of how different groups of respondents prioritized the 
different board tasks.
The practice of board tasks  
The practice of the strategy task is particularly interesting because the aim of the 
project was to contribute to business development in the High North. To understand 
how the participants in the BDP perceived actual board task performance, we asked 
Table 3: How different respondents 
prioritized board tasks
Age OwnershipBoard 
director
Chair
20
(100)
9
(100)
3
(100)
Sex
N
(%)
Strategy
Control
Service
9
(55)
4
(44)
2
(67)
11
(45)
5
(56)
1
(33)
5
(25)
6
(67)
1
(33)
15
(75)
3
(33)
2
(67)
0
0
0
19
(95)
6
(67)
3
(100)
8
(40)
4
(44)
1
(33)
12
(60)
5
(56)
2
(67)
12
(60)
4
(44)
2
(67)
8
(40)
5
(56)
1
(33)
1
(5)
3
(33)
o
Male Fem. 20-35 36-50 51-65 Yes No Yes No Yes No
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open-ended questions in Survey 3. Table 4 was developed based on a summary of 
previous research on board tasks and activities describing the investigated relations 
between tasks, task dimensions, and examples of related activities (Machold and 
Farquhar 2013, 155). The table compares illustrative examples from our data with 
subcategories and activities of different board tasks described in the literature. 
As seen in Table 4, the respondents were quite specific in their ideas of the control 
task. The participants described the control task by referring to activities that they 
perform, and not only to the principles of control. These activities can be summari-
zed as “making sure” that laws are followed in business operations, that the business 
operates within healthy economic frames, that the business operates according to the 
board’s decisions, and that the owners’ interests are taken care of. While it was not 
included in the presentations and discussions about the control task in the BDP, the 
respondents included strategic control in their descriptions of the control task.
The service task is particularly relevant in the dyadic relationship between the chair 
of the board and the CEO because most of the activities involved here have an indi-
rect influence on value creation (van den Heuvel et al. 2006). When the participants 
described the service task, they referred to vital goals. However, their descriptions 
of the kind of activities involved were quite vague and associated with “helping the 
CEO”. Although the respondents’ perception of the service task as helping the CEO 
is appropriate, it is interesting that their descriptions of what they actually did were 
significantly less specific than their descriptions of control activities. For example, 
they described helping the CEO by sharing knowledge, but did not specify when, 
how, and what knowledge they shared. They highlighted situations in which it might 
be necessary to help the CEO, for example when making difficult decisions. However, 
they did not describe what they did to help the CEO in such situations or the type of 
decisions for which this help was required.
The perceptions of the strategy task were surprisingly underdeveloped by our respon-
dents, bearing in mind that they considered this the most important task. “Long-term 
issues” seemed to be strongly associated with this as the participants described the 
goal of this task as long-term thinking. However, they did not include ideas of what 
Table 4: The perceptions of board 
task practice (Next page)
THE ART OF UNTANGLING: HIGH NORTH SME BOARD DIRECTORS’  
CHALLENGES IN UNDERSTANDING STRATEGY, CONTROL, AND SERVICE TASKS
HILDE FJELLVÆR, TRUDE HØGVOLD OLSEN AND ELSA SOLSTAD  |  Pages 16– 37
28 BARENTS STUDIES: Governance in the High North: Rhetoric and reality in the Barents region VOL. 6 |  ISSUE 1  |  2019 SPECIAL ISSUE
“Ensure that the laws are followed”
“Control that the business is operating according to laws, ethics, and accountability”
“Comply with formal criteria in different laws” 
“Ensure financially secure operations”
“Supervise the company’s financial development”
“Have competences to read the budget critically
“Control that the company is on the right course according to the strategy”
“Ensure that the decisions of the board are implemented”
“To manage the owners’ investments in the best possible ways”
“Control that the administration manages the company to the best for the company, the owners, and the society” 
“Monitor potential conflicts that may harm the company”
Illustrative citations of board 
activities in our data
Control task
Service task
“To adjust the course and coach the management”
“Being a sparring partner for the management”
“Make suggestions, contribute to finding the direction, sharing knowledge”
“Help the CEO to make difficult decisions”
“Being a positive ambassador for the company” 
“Being available”
“Give advice in challenging decisions”
“Being a gatekeeper to the board directors’ networks”
“Making use of one’s own network”
“Being a door-opener”
Strategy task
“Make good decisions and make sure they are implemented”
“The board should plot a course”
“To set objectives and give direction to the company’s activities”
“The board’s main role is to make sure that the strategy is correct”
“Decide on a joint plan and create an understanding of the way ahead”
“Facilitate good decision processes”
“A good board with directors who complement each other regarding competences and opinions will be able to see challenges from  
different angles and therefore make better decisions” 
“Contribute with knowledge from other industries and companies” 
“Utilize the competence represented in the board”
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“Ensure that the laws are followed”
“Control that the business is operating according to laws, ethics, and accountability”
“Comply with formal criteria in different laws” 
“Ensure financially secure operations”
“Supervise the company’s financial development”
“Have competences to read the budget critically
“Control that the company is on the right course according to the strategy”
“Ensure that the decisions of the board are implemented”
“To manage the owners’ investments in the best possible ways”
“Control that the administration manages the company to the best for the company, the owners, and the society” 
“Monitor potential conflicts that may harm the company”
Make sure that laws are followed in 
business operations
Make sure that the business  
operates within healthy 
economic frames
Make sure that the business 
operates according to the board’s 
decisions
Make sure that owners’ interests 
are taken care of
Monitoring, review and control of  
procedures and policies  
(Machold and Farquhar 2013, 155)
Monitoring and control of 
 activities and budgets  
(Machold and Farquhar 2013, 155)
Monitoring and control of business and 
strategic plans (Machold and Farquhar 
2013, 155)
Initiate and follow up management control 
systems, assess top management, and 
determine incentives and sanctions, define 
decision power delegated to CEO
Behaviour control  
(Huse 2007; Minichilli et al. 2009;  
Zona and Zattoni 2007)
Output/quantitative control  
(Huse 2007; Minichilli et al. 2009;  
Zahra and Pearce 1989)
Strategic control (Carpenter and 
Westphal 2001; Minichilli et al. 2009; 
Wan and Ong 2005)
Control of the executive team (Carpenter 
and Westphal 2001; Huse 2007; Van den 
Heuvel et al. 2006; Zahra and Pearce 
1989)
Summary of activities  
described in our data
Activities described  
in the literature 
Subcategories in the literature 
(Machold and Farquhar 2013, 155)
“To adjust the course and coach the management”
“Being a sparring partner for the management”
“Make suggestions, contribute to finding the direction, sharing knowledge”
“Help the CEO to make difficult decisions”
“Being a positive ambassador for the company” 
“Being available”
“Give advice in challenging decisions”
“Being a gatekeeper to the board directors’ networks”
“Making use of one’s own network”
“Being a door-opener”
Help the CEO by sharing 
knowledge
Help the CEO
Give advice to the CEO
Help the CEO by introducing him/
her to new networks and by using 
own networks to the benefit  
of the company
Access to financial and knowledge resources 
Follow-up of specific processes and details, 
work as a sounding board for new CEOs 
and SMEs, sources of information 
Discuss how to supplement existing  
knowledge and competencies 
Monitoring of rivals,  
access to information and people
Provision of resources (Hillman and 
Dalziel 2003; Wan and Ong 2005)
Mentoring (Huse 2007)
Advice (Huse 2007; Minichilli et al. 2009; 
Wan and Ong 2005)
External networking and legitimacy 
(Huse 2007; 
Minichilli et al. 2009; Zahra and Pearce 
1989; Huse and Rindova 2001)
“Make good decisions and make sure they are implemented”
“The board should plot a course”
“To set objectives and give direction to the company’s activities”
“The board’s main role is to make sure that the strategy is correct”
“Decide on a joint plan and create an understanding of the way ahead”
“Facilitate good decision processes”
“A good board with directors who complement each other regarding competences and opinions will be able to see challenges from  
different angles and therefore make better decisions” 
“Contribute with knowledge from other industries and companies” 
“Utilize the competence represented in the board”
Give long-term directions to the 
company’s activities
Make decisions
Facilitate decision processes
Utilize competences represented 
on the board 
Choose between strategic options, review 
and analyse the CEO’s proposals 
Discuss the existing strategy and determine 
the degree of strategic renewal, identify and 
interpret 
Make strategic proposals, take part in 
dealing with crises, determine and maintain 
the definition of borders 
Taking strategic decisions (Judge and 
Zeithaml 1992; Huse 2007; Ruigrok et al. 
2006; Stiles and Taylor 2002;  
Wan and Ong 2005)
Shaping strategic decisions (Judge and 
Zeithaml 1992; Huse 2007; Minichilli et 
al. 2009; Ruigrok et al. 2006; Stiles and 
Taylor 2002)
Influencing content, process, and conduct 
of strategy (Demb and Neubauer 1992; 
Huse 2007; Minichilli et al. 2009; Ruigrok 
et al. 2006; Pettigrew 1992a; Stiles 2001)
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this meant or how to achieve it, nor did they mention networks and the role that net-
works can play in the strategy process when describing actual activities related to the 
strategy task. Instead, they regarded networks as part of the service task role.
While the respondents’ descriptions of the activities related to the control and service 
tasks could be generalized into verbs such as “make sure” and “help”, the descriptions 
of activities related to the strategy task rest with verbs such as “facilitate” and “give 
direction”. Our respondents described a difference between facilitating good decision 
processes and actually making decisions. However, our data do not provide descrip-
tions of what board directors actually did to facilitate and make decisions. These 
findings show that the respondents had a rather limited understanding of the service 
and strategy tasks.
DISCUSSION
The aim of the BDP was to develop the participants’ understanding of board work, 
and by doing that the ultimate goal was to mentor board directors who could, in 
turn, contribute to SME business development. Surprisingly, although the program-
me highlighted a full range of tasks, we found that the respondents had difficulties 
grasping the meaning of the board’s service and strategy tasks, resulting in a 
mismatch between boards’ need to focus on strategy and service and respondents’ 
primary focus on control tasks. However, we also found that the board directors’ un-
derstanding of these tasks develops over time. These findings imply challenges for the 
potential of SME board directors and boards to contribute to business development.
We have seen that the individuals’ perceptions of the detail of board tasks varied 
greatly. The respondents specifically described that they practised control tasks 
according to activities associated with four different types of control (Machold and 
Farquhar 2013): behaviour control, output control, strategic control, and control of 
the executive team. Even though most of the literature can give an impression that 
the control task is limited to control regarding ownership interests, financial control, 
and legal issues (Kaufman and Englander 2005; Tricker 2012), our respondents also 
included control of strategy (Carpenter and Westphal 2001; Machold and Farquhar 
2013; Minichilli et al. 2009; Wan and Ong 2005). Activities associated with strategic 
control represent the board’s indirect influence on strategy (Fiegener 2005) through 
evaluating past performance, conducting high-level reviews of strategic plans, and 
monitoring executive and firm performance (Hendry and Kiel 2004).
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Regarding the service task, the literature covers a much broader spectrum of activi-
ties (Huse 2007; Machold and Farquhar 2013) than “helping the CEO”, as illustrated 
in our data. The service activities considered in the literature are more specific than 
the respondents’ notions. They range from directors following up at both an indivi-
dual and an organizational level to examples of specific activities to provide infor-
mation on alternatives and people, follow up on specific processes and details, and 
monitor rivals (e.g., Huse 2007; Minichilli et al. 2009; Wan and Ong 2005). To be able 
to provide assistance, directors need to be aware of the range of possible activities. 
For example, mentoring and advice are activities that are dependent on interaction 
and trust between CEO and directors, and the individual director’s experience, com-
petences, and networks will be crucial. However, the provision of resources, external 
networking, and legitimacy are less tied to the CEO–director dyad but instead 
depend on external–internal relations and the ways in which directors can contribute 
to the focal organization rather than to the CEO him/herself. The rather narrow 
understanding of the service task among the respondents could thus hamper their 
contribution to business development.
Even though the respondents described strategy task activities in terms of taking 
and shaping strategic decisions as well as shaping the content, process, and con-
ducting of strategy (Machold and Farquhar 2013; Stiles 2001), their descriptions 
were vague. To handle these tasks, the literature highlights board composition, net-
works, and the board’s involvement in the strategic decision process. The board can 
influence strategy directly by involvement in strategic decision making, by ratifying 
strategic proposals (taking strategic decisions), by asking probing questions (stra-
tegic content), and by helping to formulate, assess, and decide upon strategic alter-
natives (shaping strategic decisions and shaping the strategic content and context) 
(McNulty and Pettigrew 1999).
Even though the respondents’ descriptions of the strategy task were vague, they were 
explicit about how they exercised strategic control – for example by making sure 
the business operated in accordance with the board’s decisions. This observation 
can partly be explained by interactions between board tasks that make it difficult to 
delineate board tasks in practice (Machold and Farquhar 2013). So, does it matter 
whether the respondents label board activities as strategy or control as long as the 
tasks are performed? After all, for CEOs in High North SMEs, a board focusing on 
control may represent a safety net in terms of the company’s compliance with laws 
and regulations. Still, we argue that it does matter. For example, an important distinc-
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tion between strategy and control tasks is the time perspective. While control means 
an assessment of history, strategy tasks are future-oriented and focus on how to 
develop the business. In a context where growth and innovation are presented as the 
main business challenges, strategy is important. Even though strategic control may 
be a necessary condition for business development, board directors who operate with 
a mindset characterized by control could be hampered in their ability to put business 
development on the agenda because their cognitive framing will influence their per-
ceptions and subsequent actions (Cornelissen and Werner 2014). The strategy task is 
varied and dependent on, for example, the industry the company competes in, stages 
in business development, and ownership structure. The literature has also identified 
a range of activities board directors can engage in such as identifying problems and 
developing solutions by, for instance, scanning the environment (Rindova 1999).
Above we have highlighted the need to understand all of the tasks boards should 
engage in. However, it is even more important that they are able to engage in a multi-
plicity of tasks. The seminars in the BDP emphasized the three main tasks separately, 
but we found little evidence of emphasis placed on the interaction between tasks or 
the ability to move between them. Our data show that respondents with extensive 
board experience were more likely to prioritize strategy tasks than were respondents 
with little or no board experience, suggesting that the understanding of board tasks, 
their importance, and their interdependence develop over time. In development pro-
grammes, participants will understand the content based on their prior knowledge. 
The less prior knowledge you have, the more you tend to focus on the things that 
are easy to grasp. It is reasonable to assume that the programme participants with 
less prior knowledge possessed less power than the experienced board directors in 
the programme. This finding is in line with research that shows that the more power 
an individual has, the more abstract thinking they are able to engage in (Smith and 
Trope 2006). The understanding of board tasks may also be context-dependent. The 
limited understanding of service and strategy tasks identified here could be unders-
tood in the light of the characteristics of the region in our study where businesses 
scored high on economic results but low on growth and innovation, implying that 
they concentrate more on control than strategy.
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CONCLUSION
Boards of directors represent an important, but understudied, resource for business 
development of High North SMEs. Board directors can influence business develop-
ment through strategy and service tasks. Our study contributes to the literature by 
identifying two challenges of board directors’ contribution to business development 
in SMEs: an underdeveloped understanding of strategy and service tasks and a mis-
match between what SME boards need (strategy) and what board directors seem to 
focus on (control). This mismatch could imply that SMEs in peripheral regions such 
as the High North are held back because competence regarding strategy and busi-
ness development may not be available to them. In Norway, board work is seldom 
included as a compulsory course in bachelor’s and master’s programmes at business 
schools. Knowledge and skills in board work are learned through practice in the bo-
ardrooms. Projects like the studied BDP open up possibilities for the participants to 
share and discuss board work experiences outside of their own boardrooms. One way 
to develop such programmes further is to include activities targeted at strengthening 
CEO relations – for example, by including sessions where CEOs and board directors 
participate together. Arenas for collective reflections seem especially important in 
areas where geographical distance may be a barrier for sharing experiences. Such 
programmes may contribute to the collective sense-making of boards’ roles in High 
North SME business development by, for instance, highlighting the interdependence 
between tasks of strategic control and strategic development.
Our data raise new questions about board dynamics that seems particularly import-
ant for High North SMEs. Further research is needed to understand how boards 
engage in continuous business development. Interesting questions to explore include 
how board composition in SMEs affects the understanding of the board’s tasks, whet-
her boards in SMEs have capacity beyond the control task, and whether and how the 
control task, including strategic control, contributes to business development. Given 
that there is a potential mismatch between the control role focus of many directors 
and SMEs’ need for business development, future research should examine whether 
there are any particular challenges or benefits for SMEs in the High North in achie-
ving a better dynamic between these tasks. This would provide a base of knowledge 
on which to build future board development programmes.
Our research can help board directors understand more of the variety of board task 
activities that are important for business development. A better grasp of constructs 
and ideas of board work could enable directors to see the link between their activities 
THE ART OF UNTANGLING: HIGH NORTH SME BOARD DIRECTORS’  
CHALLENGES IN UNDERSTANDING STRATEGY, CONTROL, AND SERVICE TASKS
HILDE FJELLVÆR, TRUDE HØGVOLD OLSEN AND ELSA SOLSTAD  |  Pages 16– 37
34 BARENTS STUDIES: Governance in the High North: Rhetoric and reality in the Barents region VOL. 6 |  ISSUE 1  |  2019 SPECIAL ISSUE
and the potential for business development more clearly. When designing board 
development programmes, it might also be pertinent to include elements promoting 
the understanding that in order to contribute to business development, boards of 
directors must engage in multiple activities. Such development programmes should 
explicitly challenge the directors’ awareness of the actual tasks that they do or do not 
engage in. The BDP had participants with no board experience and also with extensi-
ve board experience. Even though this facilitated knowledge transfer from the expe-
rienced to the inexperienced, the programme cannot, in the short and intermediate 
term, provide the necessary foundation to raise the awareness and competence of 
less experienced candidates to understand and execute the multiplicity of necessary 
board tasks.
The study also has implications for what owners of SMEs looking for a board of 
directors should focus on. First, avoid family or friends (Huse 2011), try to recruit a 
group of people with complementary competencies including someone who unders-
tands the particular industry or has operational experience (Zattoni and Pugliese 
2012). Second, strengthen the CEO–chair relation, as this is a core prerequisite for 
the development of a dynamic working relationship between the board and ma-
nagement (McNulty and Pettigrew 1999). Boards can contribute to the business by 
performing strategy tasks, but for owners of SMEs it is also vital to understand that 
boards can make a substantial contribution through service tasks in the dyadic rela-
tionship with the CEO (Nordqvist and Minichilli 2009; Huse and Gabrielsson 2012). 
This also implies that CEOs must be open to a close dialogue and interaction with 
board directors in general, and the chair in particular (Kakabadse et al. 2006).
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